The evolution of costly cooperation, where cooperators pay a personal cost to benefit others, requires that cooperators interact more frequently with other cooperators. This condition, called positive assortment, is known to occur in spatially-structured viscous populations, where individuals typically have low mobility and limited dispersal. However many social organisms across taxa, from cells and bacteria, to birds, fish and ungulates, are mobile, and live in populations with considerable inter-group mixing. In the absence of information regarding others' traits or conditional strategies, such mixing may inhibit assortment and limit the potential for cooperation to evolve. Here we employ spatiallyexplicit individual-based evolutionary simulations to incorporate costs and benefits of two coevolving costly traits: cooperative and local cohesive tendencies. We demonstrate that, despite possessing no information about others' traits or payoffs, mobility (via self-propulsion or environmental forcing) facilitates assortment of cooperators via a dynamically evolving difference in the cohesive tendencies of cooperators and defectors. We show analytically that this assortment can also be viewed in a multilevel selection framework, where selection for cooperation among emergent groups can overcome selection against cooperators within the groups. As a result of these dynamics, we find an oscillatory pattern of cooperation and defection that maintains cooperation even in the absence of well known mechanisms such as kin interactions, reciprocity, local dispersal or conditional strategies that require information on others' strategies or payoffs. Our results offer insights into differential adhesion based mechanisms for positive assortment and reveal the possibility of cooperative aggregations in dynamic fission-fusion populations.
Introduction 1
In a cooperative interaction, the actor's actions benefit others. In some cases, cooperators bear a 2 fitness cost. Such costly cooperative, or 'non-selfish', traits are typically selected against in well 3 mixed populations. However, cooperation can evolve if cooperators are more likely to interact with 4 other cooperators, i.e. if there is 'positive assortment' of the cooperative allele [1, 2] . There are 5 several well known mechanisms that lead to positive assortment. Preferential interactions among close 6 genetic relatives can create assortment of cooperators by common descent [3] . Alternatively, tag-based 7 interactions, where a phenotypic tag (also called 'greenbeard') mediates preferential interactions among 8 cooperators [4] [5] [6] , can also create assortment. In the absence of abilities to recognise other individuals 9 or their traits, spatial structures arising from local dispersal of offspring and low mobility can facilitate 10 assortment by creating local clusters of cooperators [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] . Elucidating various mechanisms of positive 11 assortment has been a fundamental question in evolutionary biology. 12 Populations of many social organisms, from cells and bacteria to many species of fish and birds, 13 consist of dynamic groups that frequently merge and split. In such populations, also called 'fission-14 fusion populations' [13] , mobility (low 'population viscosity') causes considerable mixing among groups. 15 This reduces relatedness among members of groups [14, 15] , limiting interactions among close genetic 16 relatives. Therefore, the potential for assortment based on common descent would seemingly be 17 rare. Mobility also leads to paucity of repeated interactions between individuals, potentially limiting 18 reciprocal cooperation [16] . Spatial structure arising from the presence of multiple groups in such 19 populations could, in principle lead to assortment of cooperators [1, 17] . However, positive assortment 20 cannot happen in randomly formed groups [1] . Rather, it is typically expected that individuals remain 21 in their natal groups, at least over one generation, to enhance assortment [8, 9] . Groups members can 22 also adopt conditional strategies, where they can respond to others' behavioural or group traits to 23 avoid non-cooperators [18] [19] [20] [21] and to prefer interactions with cooperators. These scenarios are unlikely 24 in fission-fusion populations where groups frequently merge and split. Moreover, previous evolutionary 25 theory has demonstrated that even slight mixing among groups would be expected to abolish any 26 realistic possibility of assortment [1, 22] . Consequently, it is typically thought that the selfish interest 27 of individuals takes precedence over group-level benefits in fission-fusion populations [23] . 28 However, organisms living in dynamic social groups do exhibit various cooperative behaviours, such 29 as predator inspection [24, 25] , collective mobbing of predators [26, 27] and sentinel behaviours [28] 30 that have the potential to put cooperators at risk. Furthermore, cooperation is increasingly becoming 31 evident in the cellular domain, such as cooperative regulation of growth rates [29] , and altruistic 32 suicide by cells to benefit neighbouring cells [30, 31] . Such microbial populations are also often mobile, 33 either through self-propulsion or via environmental forcing, forming fission-fusion groups [32] . Classical 34 theory shows that sufficiently high mobility will undercut selection for cooperation [14, 33, 34] . One 35 mechanism that generates spontaneous sorting of phenotypes in mobile social groups is differential 36 cohesion between cooperators and defectors [35] [36] [37] . However, defectors could evolve to match the 37 cohesion of cooperators, thus eliminating differential cohesion driven spatial sorting of cooperators. 38 Here, we demonstrate that explicitly accounting for the spatio-temporal nature of movement and 39 coevolutionary dynamics between cooperation and cohesion can resolve this potential paradox, revealing 40 a dynamic and emergent interplay between cooperative trait evolution and assorted spatial structure 41 within populations. 42 
Model and Methods

43
We consider self-interested (selfish) individuals within a continuous two-dimensional spatial environment. 44 To account for different ways in which organismal motility could arise, we consider two scenarios. 45 The first is where individuals are capable of mobility via self-propulsion, as is characteristic of many 46 animal populations (such as schooling fish, flocking birds, herding ungulates). The second (at an 47 opposite extreme), is where individuals have no capacity for self-propulsion, but are moved by the 48 flow of the medium in which they live, representing organisms in turbulent media (such as microbes). 49 These two cases are referred to as "active" and "passive" systems, respectively (see S1 Appendix). We 50 measure individual mobility in these two systems by the individual propulsion speed or the average 51 fluid speed of the medium, respectively. Our active system model is based on previous computational 52 frameworks that investigated the evolution of collective movement strategies under ecological scenarios 53 like migration or cannibalism [38, 39] . Our passive system model is based on the work of Torney et. 54 al [40] , which investigated collective search behaviours in dynamic environments. Here, we employ 55 these model frameworks but with different individual payoff structures to study the coevolutionary 56 dynamics of cooperation and cohesion. 57 Individual-based evolutionary model 58 In both active and passive system models, we assume that individuals have two evolvable behavioural 59 traits. The first trait is a local tendency to be cohesive with neighbours, denoted by a continuous 60 variable ω s,i ∈ [ 0, ∞) (e.g. via social interactions among animals, or regulation of cellular adhesion 61 among microbes). Cohesive interactions cause formation of groups; we define any two individuals to 62 be in the same group if the distance between them is less than a threshold denoted by R g . Depending 63 on the strength of cohesive tendencies among individuals, populations can exhibit a variety of dynamic 64 group formations, as found in social organisms (Supplementary Video 1). These can range from large 65 cohesive groups (where individuals exhibit high cohesion, or large ω s,i ) to largely solitary motion (when 66 individuals exhibit no cohesion, ω s,i = 0). We assume that individuals pay a fitness cost proportional 67 to the strength of their cohesive tendencies (c s (1 + ω s,i ) 2 for the active system and c s ω 2 s,i for the 68 passive system; see S1 Appendix for details). This could represent direct costs associated with animals 69 scanning their local area for neighbours, or production of sticky extracellular matrix by cells [41] ; and 70 indirect costs such as sharing resources or increased susceptibility to diseases associated with group 71 formation [42] . 72 We consider a second, binary trait that represents strategies of cooperation or defection by 73 individuals. In a pairwise interaction modelled as a prisoner's dilemma, cooperation results in a 74 personal cost c to the donor but offers a benefit b to the recipient (b > c > 0). Generalizing this to any 75 spontaneously formed group g containing n g (≥ 2) individuals of which k g are cooperators, the pay-off 76 to cooperators is (k g − 1)b/(n g − 1) − c, and that to defectors is k g b/(n g − 1). Solitary cooperators 77 get a payoff of −c and solitary defectors get zero payoff. Consequently, irrespective of group size and 78 composition, defectors in the group always receive a higher payoff than cooperators. This pay-off 79 structure excludes self-benefits and is also called strong altruism, which evolves only in a very narrow 80 range of conditions [43] .
81
The fitness of each individual is determined from a baseline payoff plus the payoffs associated with 82 cooperative interactions minus the costs of cohesiveness. We assume non-overlapping generations. 83 Therefore, individuals reproduce with a probability proportional to their relative fitness in the 84 population, and then die. Offspring inherit both traits with a small probability of mutation and are 85 dispersed to random locations in space. Such random dispersal makes the average relatedness of 86 individuals within any local neighbourhood equal to the population average, as has been reported 87 in fission-fusion societies [15] . Thus, we have deliberately assumed a simple scenario involving non-88 repeated cooperative games among non-kin where individuals cannot assess others' behavioural traits 89 or payoffs of interactions. Thus, mechanisms of cooperation such as kin-interactions, local dispersal 90 and conditional strategies are ruled out. Please see S1 Appendix for more details of the model and 91 other pay-off matrices. 92 We define population-level trait values of cooperation and cohesion (denoted by p and ω s ) as 93 averages of the individual trait values (ω c,i and ω s,i ) over the population for a given generation. We 94 then define the 'evolved cooperative tendency' (denoted byp), and 'evolved cohesive tendency' (denoted 95 byω s ) as an average of the respective population-level traits over 1500 generations, further averaged 96 across ten replicate populations (see S1 Appendix). We examine evolved cooperative and cohesive 97 tendencies as compared to baseline cases. The baseline for cohesive tendencies is obtained by setting 98 the proportion of cooperators to zero (i.e. only the cohesive tendencies evolve). There are two plausible 99 baselines for cooperative tendencies, both representing well-mixed systems in which cooperation is not 100 expected to evolve if the population size is infinity: 1) Solitary baseline -this is obtained assuming 101 that the cohesive tendency for all individuals is zero (ω s,i = 0); therefore, cooperative interactions 102 occur due to chance encounters alone. 2) Single group baseline -this is obtained assuming that 103 the cost of cohesion is zero, which results in all individuals to evolve large cohesive tendencies (i.e. 104 effectively ω s,i → ∞) and form a single cohesive group. The interactions would then resemble those in 105 a well-mixed population. Although other baseline scenarios that represent well-mixed systems can, in 106 principle, be constructed, e.g. all individuals have an intermediate value of cohesive tendencies, one 107 of our goals is to investigate if the coevolutionary dynamics between cooperation and cohesion may 108 indeed select for an intermediate value of cohesive tendencies. Therefore, we avoid intermediate values 109 of ω s,i as baseline scenarios.
110
Results
111
Evolution of cooperation and fission-fusion dynamics 112 We find that in both active and passive systems, mobility facilitates the evolution of cooperation 113 together with local cohesive tendencies, over a range of values spanning several orders of magnitude 114 (Fig 1a-d) . Consequently, the evolved populations exhibit merge and split group dynamics, and at the 115 same time, there exists coexistence of cooperators and defectors ( Fig 1a-b and Supplementary Videos 116 1-2). The evolved proportion of cooperators is much higher when both the cohesive and cooperative 117 traits coevolve, as opposed to when only the cooperative trait, but not the cohesive trait, can evolve 118 (black smooth line versus the broken black line in Fig 1c-d ; also see S3 Appendix). Likewise, the 119 evolved cohesive tendency is higher in the coevolutionary scenario when compared to cases where only 120 the cohesive tendency, but not the cooperative trait, evolves (blue smooth line versus the broken blue 121 line in Fig 1c-d ; also see S3 Appendix).
122
In both active and passive systems, the evolved proportion of cooperators and their associated 123 cohesive tendencies reduce as a function of costs of cooperation, as intuitively expected (Fig 2a,b ;e,f). 124 As cost of cohesion increases, we find that cooperators increase in the population (Fig 2 c,d ) but this 125 effect is small for the passive system. However, the overall cohesive tendencies decrease with cost of 126 cohesion (Fig 2g,h) . Furthermore, the coevolutionary scenario leads to increased levels of cooperation 127 and cohesion in comparison to a case where only the cooperative trait (solitary and single group 128 baselines in Fig 2a, b ), or the cohesive trait ('No coop' baseline in Fig 2g, h) is allowed to evolve. We 129 also observe that the coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and cohesion do not reach a steady state, 130 and instead fluctuate over time (Fig 3a for active system, S3 Figure-a for passive system). Except 131 when the costs of cohesion or cooperation are high, evolved populations exhibit fission-fusion dynamics. 132 We find that our results are robust to a number of modifications to model parameters and 133 specifications, such as the criterion we used for defining a group, the system size of the simulations, 134 specific rules of interactions among neighbours, and the turbulence intensity (S2 Appendix). In 135 addition, we also modified the payoff structure of cooperation: In the standard multiplayer prisoner's 136 dilemma that we have studied so far, benefits of cooperation are shared equally among all group 137 members (except the cooperator who contributed that benefit). The cost of cooperation, however, is 138 not shared. This is a reasonable representation of many biological systems, especially in the microbial 139 world [30, 44] . However, in scenarios like alarm calling, where an individual calls to warn others of an 140 approaching predator, the benefits of the call may be available fully to all nearby individuals even if 141 a single individual produces a call. The payoff is therefore not divided among group members. To 142 account for such scenarios, we considered payoff structures where the benefits and the costs may or may 143 not depend on the group size. We find that our results are robust to such variations (S5 Appendix). 144
Emergence of assortment 145
We derive the condition for increase in cooperators for any given population structure in our model 146 using first principles, i.e. by computing the expected number of offspring of cooperators and defectors 147 in the next generation (S3 Appendix). Since our model assumes synchronous global reproduction and 148 Table 1 (see S1 Appendix).
random dispersal, we obtain the same condition starting with the Price Equation (see S4 Appendix). 149 We then derive the assortment of the cooperative genotype.
150
The condition for increase in cooperators is rb > c, where
where p is the total proportion of cooperators (i.e. the average cooperative tendency of the population 152 at a given generation), p g is the proportion of cooperators in group g, and n g is the size of group g. 153 The summations are performed over groups of size greater than one.
154
The variable r in expression 1 is identical to the assortment of the cooperative genotype, defined Table 1 (see S1 Appendix).
as the coefficient of regression of the actor's genotype on the genotype of its co-players [1, 2] :
where, p ig is the indicator variable that individual i in group g is a cooperator. 155 We compute r from the emergent population and group structure in our simulations, and find that 156 cooperators increase in frequency when rb > c, as per the theoretical prediction (Fig 3b; S3 Figure-b ). 157 We emphasize that we began our simulations with all individuals being defectors and having no cohesive 158 tendencies. The evolved populations where individuals have local cohesive interactions led to group 159 structures with positive assortment. In other words, assortment is not imposed by our simulations. 160 Rather, it is a consequence of coevolutionary dynamics of cooperation and cohesive interactions.
161
Evolved differences in cohesive tendencies create assortment 162 We now address the question: What are the proximate and ultimate mechanisms for the emergence 163 of a group structure with positive assortment? The answer lies in the coevolutionary dynamics, and 164 spontaneous "self-sorting" within populations [35, 36] . The average cohesive tendency of cooperators 165 within the population (ω sc ) differs from that of defectors (ω sd ) in every generation, even though the 166 average difference across generations is zero. This variation in social cohesion among individuals results 167 Table 1 (see S1 Appendix).
in group-level assortment of individuals based on the cohesive trait (Fig 3c) , as has previously been 168 hypothesized for animal and cellular groups [35] [36] [37] 45] . Cooperators benefit from positive assortment 169 when their cohesive tendency is higher than that of defectors (i.e. ∆ω s = ω sc − ω sd > 0; Fig 3c; S3 170 Figure-c). By contrast, defectors benefit by having the same cohesive tendency as cooperators because 171 of increased likelihood of joining cooperator groups. Our analysis of the time series of the population 172 cohesive tendency shows that ω sd lags behind ω sc by one generation (Fig 3d; S3 Figure-d ). This 173 means that cooperators evolve higher ω sc than defectors to achieve positive assortment, but defectors 174 evolve to match their ω sd to that of cooperators. This resembles an arms race between them over the 175 costly cohesive trait [46] , which continues until the cost of cohesion can no longer be offset by the 176 benefits of assortment.
177
Analytical model for coevolutionary arms race dynamics 178 Simplified model and analytical approximation: To further investigate the arms race dynamics, we 179 develop an analytical model for a simplified version of our system. Here too, we consider two evolvable 180 traits: (i) a binary cooperative trait ω c,i as before, i.e. cooperation or defection, and (ii) a binary 181 cohesive trait, where individuals are either highly cohesive (ω s,i = 1) or non-cohesive (ω s,i = 0), in 182 contrast to the continuous valued trait used earlier. This simplification to a binary trait is motivated 183 by the results of the previous section which showed that cooperators and defectors evolve differential 184 cohesive tendencies. Despite the above simplification, numerical simulations reveal that this model 185 can capture various possible movement strategies, from solitary movement (when all individuals are 186 non-cohesive) to fission-fusion group dynamics (when all individuals are cohesive). Besides analytical 187 tractability, a key advantage of this binary trait model is that it amplifies the payoff differences between 188 different types of individuals. As we show below, it helps us reveal finer mechanisms and the role of 189 cost of cohesion in driving the coevolutionary arms race dynamics. Here, we present an analytical 190 approximation for this model based on the replicator dynamics and multilevel selection formalism. In 191 S7 Appendix, we present a detailed derivation of the analytical model and compare the results with 192 those from spatial simulations that explicitly include movement.
193
The population in this simplified model has four types of individuals: solitary cooperators, solitary 194 defectors, cohesive cooperators and cohesive defectors. The dynamics of the system is completely 195 defined by the relative frequencies of any three of these types, since the population size is held 196 constant. The multilevel selection approach provides an intuitive and analytically tractable framework 197 to model the dynamics of these different types: we consider the individual level selection pressure 198 on cooperators separately within the cohesive and non-cohesive sub-populations, and the group level 199 selection pressure between the cohesive and non-cohesive sub-populations. Since the cohesive and 200 non-cohesive sub-populations are well-mixed, we can write replicator equations for the proportion of 201 cooperators within each of them (denoted by p f and p s , respectively). We can write another replicator 202 equation for the proportion of cohesive individuals (q). The dynamics of the system is then described 203 by the following differential equations (see S7 Appendix for a detailed analytical derivation):
where σ i represents magnitude of noise due to stochastic group formation and mutations (described 205 in detail in S7 Appendix), η i (t) are standard Gaussian white noise processes, and ν = (n − 1)/n with 206 n being the average group size experienced by cohesive individuals. We also assume that the noise 207 terms for the three equations are independent. Since the focus of this model is to obtain conditions 208 for selection for cooperation and the arms race dynamics, we did not explicitly model mobility. We 209 assumed that there is sufficient mobility to cause group formation among cohesive individuals. From 210 the above three equations, we can show that dynamics of the overall proportion of cooperators in the 211 population p can be written as 212 dp dt
where
Here, if b eff (> −c s ) and c eff (> 0) are treated as the effective benefits and costs incurred by cooperators, 213 then r can be interpreted as the assortment coefficient (see S7 Appendix for derivation and more 214 details). The effective benefit to cooperators (b eff ) increases with the proportion of cohesive and 215 solitary cooperators (p f and p s ), and is net positive only if the benefit from cooperation exceeds the 216 cost of cohesion. The effective cost of cooperation (c eff ) is equal to c when there is no variability of 217 cooperators among cohesive and solitary types (p f = p s ), and reduces with increasing variability.
218
Multilevel selection: Equations (3) and (4) describe 'within-group' selection against cooperation, 219 and cause both cohesive cooperators (p f ) and solitary cooperators (p s ) to decrease. Even so, as 220 equation (6) shows, cooperators can increase in the overall population if rb eff − c eff > 0. Biologically, 221 the relation r = ∆ω s implies that assortment is achieved by a differential cohesion between cooperators 222 and defectors. Thus, our multilevel selection approach formally demonstrates our key simulation result 223 from Fig 3C, and is consistent with the understanding of assortment developed using the inclusive 224 fitness approach.
225
Arms race dynamics: Coupled stochastic differential equations (3-5) fully describe the coevolutionary 226 dynamics of our system, but the noise terms in Equations (3-5) make it analytically intractable. 227 Therefore we simulated these equations numerically using Ito interpretation. We find that, similar 228 to our previous result of individual based models (Fig 3a) , the average proportion of cooperators p 229 (= q p f + (1 − q) p s ) and the average cohesive tendency ω s (= q) do not reach a steady state (Fig 4a) . 230 All other results corresponding to the Figures 2 and 3 of the continuous trait model remain the same, 231 in this simplified analytical model as well. However, the cyclical dynamics of Fig 3a become amplified, 232 exhibiting four clearly distinguishable 'phases' in the time series of ω s (Fig 4a) : (a) Phase I, where 233 the population has very low cohesive tendencies (ω s ≈ 0) with nearly all individuals being solitary 234 (marked by magenta bands along the generations axis in Fig 4a) , (b) Phase II, where the cohesion 235 rapidly increases (blue bands), (c) Phase III with nearly all individuals being cohesive (ω s ≈ 1, grey 236 bands), and (d) Phase IV, where the average cohesion reduces again (red bands). We explain this 237 dynamic below.
238
When the population consists of all non-cohesive individuals as in Phase I (q ≈ 0), the difference 239 between cohesive tendencies of cooperators and defectors is close to zero (∆ω s ≈ 0; Fig 4b, d ; top 240 panel). In such a population which has a very few cohesive individuals, a few mutants that are both 241 cooperative and cohesive cause p f to sharply increase. As p f rises beyond a threshold (p f > c s /(bν −c)), 242 groups of cohesive-cooperators form and get a higher pay-off than the rest of the population despite 243 costs associated with both traits (∆V > 0, Fig 4c; bottom panel) . This initiates phase II, where 244 we observe a rapid increase in the proportion of cohesive individuals (dq/dt > 0). This increase is 245 driven by a consistent positive ∆ω s (Fig 4c; top panel) , akin to an arms race for the costly cohesive 246 tendency. The above arms race continues until all individuals are cohesive (q ≈ 1), and thus the system 247 reaches Phase III. Here, the differential cohesion and assortment is lost again (r = ∆ω s ≈ 0;), putting 248 cooperators at a disadvantage. As cooperators become rare (p f < c s /(bν − c)), the benefits of grouping 249 due to positive assortment can no longer offset the costs of cohesion. Thus, both cooperators and 250 defectors now reduce their cohesive tendencies (dq/dt < 0) leading to Phase IV in which population 251 quickly shifts to all solitary individuals. At the end of Phase IV, most individuals have no cohesive 252 tendency, a scenario where cooperators are at a disadvantage in comparison to defectors. Therefore, 253 the system is back to Phase I. The cycle then repeats. We represent the four phases on an ω s vs p plot 254 as in Fig 5. This figure also shows representative snapshots of how an equivalent spatial system would 255 look, at various time points during these phases. 256 Finally, we compare the timeseries obtained from the stochastic differential equations (SDEs) above 257 and its analysis (Fig 4) , with explicit spatial individual based simulations of individuals with a binary 258 cohesive trait (S5 Figure) . We find qualitative agreement between the two timeseries and their features. 259 Further, S6 Figure shows the four phases from spatial simulations, which is in agreement with that 260 obtained from the SDEs (Fig 5) .
261
Discussion
262
Our spatially explicit simulations demonstrate that mobility, arising from either self-propulsion or 263 environmental forcing, can promote the evolution of cooperation via emergent group dynamics. Our 264 models, including an analytical formulation, predict that cooperators and defectors can coexist by 265 evolving differential strengths of cohesive interactions. This difference in local cohesion results in 266 a spontaneous assortment of cooperators. The cost of cohesion plays a crucial role in maintaining 267 differential cohesive tendencies, thus preventing a run-away selection for cohesion that would eventually 268 : ω s is close to zero with no differential cohesion (∆ω s = ω sc − ω sd ≈ 0), thus no assortment (r ≈ 0) and no differential fitness (∆V = V c − V d ≈ 0) benefit to cooperators. (c) Phase II (blue): Cooperators lead an arms race to have a higher (costly) ω s since they benefit by differential cohesion and assorting; but defectors benefit by matching ω s of cooperators. (d) Phase III (grey): ω s is high and same for all individuals, thus no assortment and no differential fitness benefit to cooperators. Fig 4 ( For the sake of clarity, we have colour coded points from a single cycle, rest of the data points are in green). We show schematic snapshots representative of the expected group structure of the population, with cooperators in blue and defectors in red. In phase I, most individuals are solitary. Mutations lead to formation of cohesive and cooperative individuals and initiate the arms race to increase costly ω s , leading to Phase II which exhibits multilevel selection for cooperators. Nearly all individuals are cohesive in Phase III, destroying assortment and thus, reducing the level of cooperation. Finally, cooperators and defectors reduce the costly cohesive tendencies, thus reaching the Phase I back where p and ω s are both low. These four phases repeat over generations. benefit defectors. Consequently, an arms race like dynamics ensues between cooperators and defectors 269 for costly cohesive tendencies. Our proposed mechanism for the evolution of cooperation among 270 non-kin depends on individual mobility and cohesive interactions. With these ingredients, we show 271 that cooperation could occur even in the absence of limited dispersal or behavioural traits such as 272 attraction to a phenotypic tag or moving away from unfavourable groups. Broadly, our study reveals 273 that movement and emergent group dynamics, often thought to create mixing and thus destroy 274 assortment, can facilitate coexistence of cooperation and defection among non-kin under a diverse 275 range of ecological scenarios.
276
Comparison with previous models and frameworks 277 Here, we discuss how the assumptions of our model preclude many known mechanisms of cooperation 278 such as those arising from interactions between relatives, conditional strategies, and local dispersal. 279 We then compare our results with greenbeard strategies and other studies employing an agent-based 280 modelling framework and collective movement.
281
In our model we assumed that offspring disperse globally and move over relatively long time scales 282 to reach an equilibrium group structure. Such large scale dispersal and mobility make the average 283 relatedness of individuals within any local neighbourhood equal to the population average, as has been 284 reported in fission-fusion societies [15] . This ruled out preferential interactions among genetic relatives 285 within our model. Secondly, individuals could respond to nearby individuals' positions and velocities 286 (active system), or positions alone (passive system), but they had no ability to assess their cooperative 287 behaviours, cohesive tendencies or the associated payoffs. Therefore, reciprocal strategies such as 288 tit-for-tat [16] were ruled out. In addition, conditional mobility strategies such as inherent differential 289 movement [47] , 'walk-away' [20] or 'success-driven migration' strategies [48] , where cooperators assess 290 the neighbourhood and move away from non-cooperators and/or unfavourable environments, were not 291 applicable. Thirdly, studies have argued that spatial or network structures can facilitate assortment [49] . 292 These models typically assume a cost of dispersal and incorporate local dispersal of offspring that leads 293 to spatial clustering of cooperators [7, 8, [10] [11] [12] [50] [51] [52] . By contrast, we assumed that there is no cost 294 to dispersal and mobility, and that offspring disperse randomly in space after birth (global dispersal). 295 Even if we include local dispersal in our model, initial assortment arising from local clustering is 296 destroyed by the time the system reaches a fission-fusion group dynamic equilibrium (see S5 Appendix). 297 If we include costs of dispersal and mobility within our model, we expect that results of our model 298 may converge to the local dispersal driven clustering of cooperators [9, 49] . 299 Lehmann and Keller (2006) [53] classify grouping mechanisms as greenbeards. The idea of 300 greenbeards was first proposed by Hamilton [3] and was later popularized by Dawkins [54, 55] . 301 Greenbeards were originally defined as phenotypic traits that mediate interactions and are genetically 302 linked to the cooperative trait [56, 57] . Over time, the concept of greenbeards has been generalized to 303 any trait that generates assortment and is statistically linked to the cooperative trait [58] . By this 304 definition, our differential cohesion mechanism is also a greenbeard. Theoretical studies have shown that 305 greenbeard cooperation is prone to decay over time as defectors also evolve the greenbeard [59] However, 306 recent studies [4, 5] have shown how greenbeard cooperation can arise in a cyclical manner as new 307 tags are repeatedly discovered by cooperators, only to be subsequently invaded by defectors. Our 308 model too shows cyclical behaviours of cooperation and defection (Fig 3) , reminiscent of these studies. 309 However, the mechanism described in these studies is unlikely to sustain cooperation when the tag 310 under consideration is cohesion, because cooperators are always worse off than highly cohesive defectors. 311 When cohesion is costly, cooperators can benefit by losing cohesion when they are rare. This offers 312 them an escape route, allowing them to persist. Thus, our study highlights the role of the cost of 313 cohesion in maintaining cooperation.
314
Our results complement the studies of Garcia, de Monte and colleagues who have highlighted the role 315 of adhesion in the evolution of cooperation in mobile individuals with grouping tendencies [37, 45, 60] . 316 They showed that differential cohesion among mobile cooperators and defectors can lead to clustering 317 of cooperators, resulting in fixation of cooperative trait in the population [37] . In the first two of the 318 above studies, however, they assumed the existence of difference in adhesive interactions of cooperators 319 and defectors. In the latter study, they allowed adhesion to evolve, but assumed that there is a 320 correlation, or genetic linkage, between cooperative and adhesive traits. The above works also used 321 public goods game where individuals gather some benefits of their own cooperative action. In our study, 322 we used a modelling framework similar to theirs (agent based explicit spatial modelling). However, we 323 assumed that the two traits (cooperation and cohesion/adhesion) could both evolve independently. 324 Our main finding is that a correlation between these two traits, specifically a differential cohesion 325 among cooperators and defectors, can arise spontaneously and is driven by an arms race dynamics for 326 a costly cohesive trait. Indeed, if there are large differences between cooperators and defectors to begin 327 with, our model predicts that the arms race dynamics acts to minimize those; however, cooperators will 328 still maintain a slight edge in this dynamic. Moreover, we considered the more stringent case of costly 329 cooperation by using prisoner's dilemma game. We showed that differential adhesion based mechanism 330 for the evolution of cooperation can emerge under stricter conditions than previously assumed.
331
Emergence of group-level sorting and information transfer is well studied in the context of mobile 332 animal groups [35, 36] . For example, mobile groups can reach consensus decisions and/or arrive at 333 foraging destinations even in the absence of any cues or signalling from, and abilities to recognise, 334 individuals with pertinent information [61] ; this is possible because mobility allows for separation 335 of individuals with different movement properties (e.g. speed and cohesion) within and among 336 groups [35, 38] . However, this principle has rarely been applied in the broader context of phenotypic 337 assortment and its evolutionary implications. Our explicit incorporation of mobility showed that, 338 counter to intuitive expectation, the fluidity caused by fission-fusion dynamics allows individuals 339 to potentially interact with all other individuals, facilitating assortment of phenotypically similar 340 individuals (cohesive cooperators) even when they are rare.
341
Empirical implications 342 We now discuss the implications and potential applications of our model to real systems. We predict 343 that cooperation can persist even in dynamic fission-fusion populations. Specifically, cooperation 344 in organisms where motility and dispersal are not constrained by energetic or other costs could 345 potentially be explained by our model. We note that mobility need not arise from self-propulsion alone; 346 non-motile organisms may be driven, typically at no cost to individuals, by the dynamic environment 347 (e.g. turbulent fluid) in which they are embedded (Fig 1) . Such environmental conditions could be 348 applicable to microorganisms living in turbulent oceanic environments [32] , or to primitive unicellular 349 organisms that may have lacked motility but lived in similar dynamic environments. Such systems 350 could be employed to design experimental tests of our models. Other examples include microbial 351 systems such as Chlamydomonas, which show aggregation correlated with size and motility [62] , or 352 microbes that exhibit an extreme form of cooperation requiring self-destruction, such as Streptococcus 353 pneumoniae or Salmonella typhimurium which can infect the host only if the individuals producing 354 the toxin lyse [30] . In these systems, local cohesion may arise from adhesiveness or stickiness between 355 neighbouring individuals, a trait widely found in varying degrees across a range of microbial systems. 356 It may also be worthwhile to investigate in such systems whether our proposed mechanism has a role 357 to either initiate the evolution of cooperation or sustain a baseline level of cooperation, even if other 358 mechanisms that support cooperation, such as phenotypic recognition or population viscosity, already 359 exist.
360
Mobility can play a crucial role in pathogenesis of a number of diseases. A notable example is 361 metastasis where tumour cells migrate from one organ to other. The process of migration may happen 362 collectively as sheets or clusters of cells held together by adhesive molecules [63] [64] [65] . Moreover, these 363 cells may switch between the different movement strategies depending on their micro-environmental 364 conditions. Tumour cells are also thought to cooperate among themselves to overcome the body's 365 defences [66] [67] [68] . Understanding the evolutionary basis of metastasis may provide insights into 366 developing strategies to prevent spread of the disease [65, 68] . Our simplified (binary-trait) model, 367 which demonstrates cyclical dynamics and switching between collective and solitary movement along 368 with the evolution of cooperation, can potentially offer insights into both proximate and ultimate 369 factors driving the migration of tumour cells.
370
Conclusion 371
In summary, we demonstrate that cooperation and fission-fusion dynamics can readily evolve together 372 under a diverse range of ecological scenarios via multilevel-selection dynamics facilitated by self-sorting 373 of groups. The self-sorted group structure itself emerges as a consequence of simple evolved local 374 interactions among individuals even in the absence of limited dispersal, information on traits of other 375 individuals, active group preferences, or dynamic cooperative strategies. The resulting macroscopic 376 picture is that mobility, which is typically considered to inhibit the evolution of cooperation, can 377 create conditions in which cooperation could, in fact, be much more prevalent. Our work suggests 378 that collective movement could be an evolutionary adaptation that promotes cooperation over selfish 379 interests among organisms. (Cohesive tendency is R s in the 391 active case and γ in the passive case; see S1 Appendix). In the passive system case, the background 392 colours show the potential field of the turbulent fluid. For very low cohesive tendencies, individuals 393 remain mostly solitary. For intermediate values of cohesive tendency, we get fission-fusion groups. For 394 large values of cohesive tendency, we get very few large groups. In these simulations, the cohesive 395 tendency of all individuals is identical..
396
S2 Video. Self Sorting Representative videos showing assortment due to a difference in cohesive 397 tendencies of cooperators and defectors. There is no assortment when the cohesive tendencies (R s in 398 passive case and γ in active case) of cooperators and defectors are same. In these simulations, we have 399 exaggerated the difference to make the assortment visually apparent. 400 S1 Figure 
